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Abstract: In a recent online lecture, the acclaimed novelist Amit Chaudhuri responded to
an accusation that has greeted his fiction since the start of his literary career: that since, as
he openly admits, his novels contain people and events that are drawn from his own life,
they are better thought of as thinly disguised memoirs—as not really novels at all. In this
paper, I discuss this charge by drawing on an account by the philosopher Stephen Mulhall
of the work of another distinguished novelist—J.M. Coetzee (more specifically, that work
which features the character Elizabeth Costello). In particular, I want to establish the
pertinence to Chaudhuri’s lecture of Mulhall’s analogy between aspects of that work and
the work of the influential art historian and critic Michael Fried on the history of modernist
painting. In so doing, I aim to show that the commitment to the projects of literary modernism
and realism which Mulhall sees in Coetzee (and Costello), can also be seen in Chaudhuri’s
understanding of the sense in which his novels both are, and are not, autobiographical.
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In a recent online lecture, the acclaimed novelist Amit Chaudhuri responded to anaccusation that has greeted his fiction since the start of his literary career: that since, as
he openly admits, his novels contain people and events that are drawn from his own life,
they are better thought of as thinly disguised memoirs—as not really novels at all.1 In this
paper, I discuss this charge by drawing on an account by the philosopher Stephen Mulhall
of the work of another distinguished novelist—J.M. Coetzee (more specifically, that work
which features the character Elizabeth Costello).2 In particular, I want to establish the
pertinence to Chaudhuri’s lecture of Mulhall’s analogy between aspects of that work and
the work of the influential art historian and critic Michael Fried on the history of modernist
painting. In so doing, I aim to show that the commitment to the projects of literary modernism
and realism which Mulhall sees in Coetzee (and Costello), can also be seen in Chaudhuri’s
understanding of the sense in which his novels both are, and are not, autobiographical.
Realism, Modernism, and the Novel
In addition to Fried, Mulhall draws on the work of two other influential critics and
theorists of the arts—Terry Eagleton and Ian Watt—in order to articulate his understanding
of the projects of realism and modernism in relation to the genre of the novel. And his
account takes off from the following preliminary definition of the genre, taken from the
opening of Eagleton’s The English Novel:
It is less a genre than an anti-genre. It cannibalizes other literary modes and mixes the bits
and pieces promiscuously together. You can find poetry and dramatic dialogue in the novel,
along with epic, pastoral, satire, history, elegy, tragedy and any number of other literary
modes…The novel quotes, parodies and transforms other genres, converting its literary
ancestors into mere components of itself in a kind of Oedipal vengeance on them…The
novel is an anarchic genre, since its rule is not to have rules. An anarchist is not just someone
who breaks rules, but someone who breaks rules as a rule. (Mulhall 141)
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Understanding the novel in these essentially parasitic terms immediately suggests that the
roots of the genre will reside in a certain kind of critical or Oedipal relation to a preceding
literary genre or genres; and Eagleton (like many commentators) proposes the romance
as the novel’s primary generic ancestor: “novels are romances—but romances which have
to negotiate the prosaic world of modern civilization … [a] place where romantic idealism
and disenchanted realism meet” (Mulhall 141). In other words, to the novelist, the defining
conventions of romanticism appear as no longer capable of facilitating the representation
of reality in a way that accurately captures its true nature—rather, they misrepresent or
falsify it—leading her to recognise that, in the name of a continued commitment to the
faithful representation of the real, they must be radically subverted or otherwise overturned.
In this way, from or at the moment of its birth, the novel’s characteristic conjunction of
the spirits of anarchy and realism can be understood to generate a distinctively modernist
relation to itself. As Mulhall puts it, “Modernism, realism, and the novel are as if made for
one another” (142).
He continues however by identifying what appears to be the self-defeating nature of
such an account, a problem he finds summarised in the following quote from Watt’s
canonical study of the origin of the genre in The Rise of the Novel: “Formal realism is, of
course… only a convention; and there is no reason why the report on human life which
is presented by it should in fact be any truer than those presented through the very different
conventions of other literary genres” (Mulhall 144). In effect, Watt is here pointing out
the conventionality of the conventions of formal realism, that the novel is of course as
much a literary genre as the romance: just like its generic predecessor, it is populated by
fictional individuals whose impression of reality depends on the employment of literary
resources which are no less conventional, and the text as a whole can only ever achieve a
representation of the real rather than reality itself. So, what kind of authority or superior
claim to realism can the novel actually be said to possess? And for Watt (amongst others),
the force of this question was soon to become apparent in the history of the novel, to
inevitably subversive effect. By the 1760s Tristram Shandy, for example, would not only
embody the resources of formal realism in order to create a convincing impression of
reality, but simultaneously (and to the point of parody) make their conventionality a
thematic as well as a formal issue. Consequently, Mulhall claims that it is not only the
novel’s originating relation to other literary genres that can be characterised as parasitic
or anarchic; rather it also has a similarly Oedipal relation to previous work within the
genre itself, and so to the generic conventions it has been bequeathed. This leads him to
suggest that the history of the novel might therefore be understood in terms of novelists’
repeated subjection of their inheritance of realistic conventions to critical questioning in
order better to create an impression of reality in their readers (largely, by drawing their
attention to the conventionality of those conventions). As he puts it:
[The novel] endlessly renews its claim to be an unprecedentedly faithful representation of
individual human experience of the world in comparison with other literary genres precisely
by claiming to be more faithful to that task even than its novelistic predecessors. Only by
ceaselessly testing, criticising, and otherwise innovating with respect to the conventions
through which it represents reality can the novelist create the impression that, unlike her
predecessors’ merely conventional efforts, she is conveying reality to her readers as it really
is for the first time. And since her best efforts could only result in the recreation of new
conventions, they—and so the impression of reality they make possible—will inevitably be
vulnerable to the critical questioning of her own successors. (145-6)
With this brief summary of Mulhall’s account of the relation between realism, modernism,
and the novel in place, I want now to begin my discussion of its relevance to Chaudhuri’s
understanding of his own work, and to the accusation to which that work is often subjected.
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Family Resemblances I: Chaudhuri, Coetzee, Costello
As Chaudhuri’s opening discussion of the resemblance between his maternal uncle and
F.N. Souza’s charcoal self-portrait illustrates, insofar as their subjects can be seen to share
certain common features, a portrait of one person may also be taken as the portrait of
another (we might wonder whether Souza’s self-portrait also resembles in some way
Chaudhuri himself, insofar as the author may have inherited, on his mother’s side, certain
familial features shared by his uncle). Similarly, I want to suggest that Mulhall’s portrait of
Coetzee (and importantly, Costello) as a modernist realist is one that can also be taken to
apply to Chaudhuri’s self-portrait—to his understanding, such as it is, of himself as a writer
of novels—presented in his lecture.
For example, in portraying Coetzee in such terms we might say that Mulhall takes him
to be manifesting an inherently problematic desire: that the author is simultaneously both
repelled and attracted by his inheritance of the novel’s generic conventions as the means
by which he might create a convincing appearance of reality; what we might think of as
a fundamentally unsettling experience that forces him to subject that inheritance to critical
questioning (for example by formal innovation), and thereby to occupy, seemingly despite
his literary success, an essentially unsettled or unorthodox (say, anarchic) position in relation
to the genre as a whole. And it would seem that Chaudhuri understands himself in similar
terms, and with similar consequences. For he admits to being critical of and variously
dissatisfied with the novel as a genre—confessing that he cannot help but to find its formal
conventions or rules boring, or worse, abhorrent (hardly surprising then that he should
want to devote a lecture to exploring the question of why it is that he writes novels at
all)—and so thinks of his work, again seemingly despite its success, as outside or counter
to the culture of the literary mainstream (a spirit of anarchism that gains further expression
in Chaudhuri’s development of and commitment to what he calls “literary activism”).
Nevertheless, at the same time Chaudhuri confesses that he cannot help but find himself
repeatedly drawn to the form. Indeed, despite deliberately trying to make a break from
the novel—and succeeding for nearly a decade—he was eventually unable to resist his
(insofar as he views himself as neither a “natural” writer nor reader of novels [Chaudhuri
4.5]) unnatural attraction to the practice of writing fiction and went back to it again; and
then again, and again. We might think of this apparently inescapable desire or compulsion
as disclosing the feminine side or aspect of the novel’s modernist story of Oedipal revenge;
that the novelist is somehow unwilling or unable entirely to deny the significance of the
inherited conventions which gave birth to his originating attraction to the genre, and so
to the genre itself—that he is so to speak, haunted by the figure of a mother.
But even before or behind such comparative exercises, Coetzee and Chaudhuri can be
seen to share two obvious common features that can be quickly sketched: both novelists
have been subject to critics’ continuing attempts to locate them in relation to specific
cultural, national, and literary contexts (as respectively, white and Asian, South African
and Indian; and as variously modernist or postmodernist, colonial or postcolonial); and
both have written novels which self-consciously appropriate canonical literary sources
(Robinson Crusoe in Coetzee’s Foe, the Odyssey [and to a degree, Ulysses] in Chaudhuri’s
Odysseus Abroad, in which he relocates the epic to the reality of the streets of London in
1985). And this sense of a marked similarity between the two authors is intensified when
one notes that they also have a shared propensity variously to attribute these same features
to the protagonists of their fictions (an apparent common emphasis on the identification
of author with character which eventually leads them to write texts whose narrators are
called respectively, ‘John Coetzee’ [in the trilogy Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime], and
‘Amit Chaudhuri’ [in Friend of My Youth]). For example, Coetzee’s recurring protagonist
Elisabeth Costello is like him a celebrated novelist (for Mulhall, one who shares her author’s
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modernist realist aspirations), whose Australian origins put her at risk of being treated (as
her son warns) of being treated as “a Mickey Mouse post-colonial writer”; and she too
found success in the appropriation of a canonical literary text (relocating Joyce’s Molly
Bloom from the confines of her bedroom to the reality of the streets of Dublin in 1904, in
her The House on Eccles Street). And Chaudhuri’s namesake in Friend of My Youth is also
an acclaimed novelist, who like his creator was born in Calcutta, grew up in Bombay,
and whose fifth novel (by coincidence) was also called The Immortals—and expresses a
similar resistance to the expectations of an Indian novel in English.
As Chaudhuri explains, the accusation that since he writes from life his novels are,
obviously, not really novels but memoirs, is a long-standing one. Even before the issue
returned with a new acuteness with the appearance of Amit Chaudhuri in Friend of my
Youth (Chaudhuri’s seventh novel) his work had repeatedly courted or invited this charge.
His first novel, A Strange and Sublime Address, for example, describes two childhood
visits made from Bombay by a boy, Sandeep, and his mother to his (maternal?) uncle’s
house in Calcutta; visits which Chaudhuri admits to having himself made, and at roughly
the same time (leading the publisher and critic Karl Miller, after reading a chapter, to
exclaim “It’s your bloody memoir!” [Chaudhuri 1.3]). And Odysseus Abroad (Chaudhuri’s
sixth novel)—based on memories of his days as an undergraduate in London in the early
1980s—casts his maternal uncle as Odysseus and himself as Telemachus, an initial conceit
which leads the author to map a proliferating series of features from his life onto the epic
(Chaudhuri 1.7). This approach can of course be understood to reach its vertiginous
peak or climax in Friend of My Youth, in which its first-person narrator, Amit Chaudhuri,
details a series of events during a visit to Bombay in 2011 for the purposes of a book tour
(staying at a club in Malabar Hill overlooking the building in which he grew up; visiting
the Taj Mahal hotel to exchange some shoes; being interviewed by a newspaper; eating
Parsi/Iranian food at Britannia restaurant; giving a reading from The Immortals; and missing
an absent friend who has gone into rehab) all of which had occurred in Chaudhuri’s own
life; and which ends with Amit Chaudhuri returning to Bombay, partly to engage in
research for writing what he knows will become Friend of My Youth.
Given this apparent repeated identity of author and character, it is then hardly surprising
that the questions “Is it from your life? Did this really happen?” should arise with tiresome
regularity whenever Chaudhuri is asked about his work. As he says about one such incident,
on the occasion of the publication of Friend of My Youth:
When the book came out, an interlocutor asked me, in the course of one of those events
that newly published books can’t do without, if everything I’d described in it had happened.
“More or less, I suppose. Almost all of it,” I said. “Then why call it a novel?” he asked,
smiling pityingly, as if at a man who has a chronic problem he’s not aware of. “Why not say
it’s a memoir?” (2.2)
But despite this blithe admission of the autobiographical nature of his novels, Chaudhuri
nevertheless still wants to maintain that his fiction is exactly that: that for all that he might
write from life, he still wants to claim that his novels in fact detail episodes that had no
existence prior to their writing—they are “inventions”, he “made them up” (2.4, 7.1). As
he says of Odysseus Abroad, “Everything in it is from life, and nothing in it is” (2.4).
How then are we to make sense of these apparently contradictory or paradoxical claims?
Chaudhuri explains that his immediate response to his interlocutor’s question was to argue
that the structure of the book was too fragmentary, and the excursions of Amit Chaudhuri
which formed the book’s subject too sporadic, to count as a memoir; that since a memoir
“must recount part or all of what happened to oneself… No respectable memoir should
take a such a form” (2.2). In a Wattian spirit, however, we might say that these remarks
seem hasty; we might question their prescriptive tone and invocation of the notion of
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respectability. For if the genre of the novel is subject (albeit to an intensified or defining
degree) to the rule- or convention-breaking operation of modernism, then why not other
literary genres and forms, such as autobiography? However that may be, a year or two later
Chaudhuri himself comes to reflect on the accuracy of his response and qualifies it by saying
that when he admitted that everything he’d described in Friend of My Youth had happened
(more or less), this was “true in one sense and untrue in another” (2.3); by which he meant
that although the events which the novel details had really occurred, they had done so at
different times, independent of each other. Thus, the episode of his visit to Bombay in
March 2011 which occupies the first two thirds of the book actually never took place. So,
when in the novel Chaudhuri writes the following paragraph, he takes himself as not only
staying true to his sense of what is significant, but as giving shape to what’s never existed:
In front of the building, upon the road—there’s no pavement here—sits a woman on her
haunches, displaying a basket of fruit. What she offers that the grocers’ opposite don’t, I
can’t say. In another area, there’d be a gaggle of squatting women. Here, she is one. One is
enough for Little Gibbs Road. (Chaudhuri 2.4)
As he puts it:
Although I have crossed Little Gibbs Road many times, I never crossed it in March 2011 in
the early evening, mainly because I wasn’t in Bombay in March 2011. I never saw that
woman sitting on her haunches selling fruit, though I may have seen such a woman at some
time. (2.4)
Similarly, with respect to Odysseus Abroad and A Strange and Sublime Address, the day of
19 July 1985 whose arc the former follows is non-existent (Chaudhuri admits that,
personally speaking, he was in Bombay at the time, so there was no chance of his
encountering the figures of Menelaus on Warren Street or Odysseus in Belsize Park), and
the incident in the latter, where Sandeep is present when his uncle has a heart attack,
never occurred (Chaudhuri heard about it on the phone).
For Chaudhuri then, these various factual divergences or differences (of time, order,
detail) between what really took place and what his novels describe—between episodes
that had actually happened and those he had invented—constitute the sense in which his
admission that everything described in them had occurred is both true in one sense and
untrue in another; that everything in them is from life, and yet nothing is. I want now to
argue that one way of understanding Chaudhuri’s position here is to see it an expression
of his modernist realism, of his novels as embodying a critical relation to the established
literary conventions which he has inherited to create the impression of reality. And in so
doing, I want to refer to the figure of Costello, rather than to Coetzee (thereby affirming
the latter’s success in creating the impression of the former as a modernist realist author—
his success in creating the impression of Costello as a real individual in a way that bears
comparison to that of a real human being [like a self-portrait might resemble its artist]
insofar as her position here resembles that of Chaudhuri). For as it happens, Mulhall quotes
an incident from Elisabeth Costello that is surprisingly similar to the one involving
Chaudhuri and his interlocutor. When during an interview, the eponymous author is
asked whether her most recent novel is autobiographical, she explains: “Of course we
draw upon our own lives all the time—they are our main resource, in a sense our only
resource. But no, Fire and Ice isn’t autobiography. It is a work of fiction. I made it up”
(Mulhall 167). While the unavailability to us of Fire and Ice prevents any appreciation of
the extent to which its specific mixture of life and literature compares to that of Friend of
My Youth, the parallel here between the two authors’ responses is striking.
Mulhall immediately follows this quotation with a brief but suggestive remark that relies on
his earlier analogy between the history of literary modernism and that of pictorial modernism
(as the latter is interpreted by Fried, with particular reference to the work of Manet3):
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This is the analogue in Costello to Manet’s acknowledgment of his paintings as both
conditioned by, and yet not reducible to, the fact of their being painted, and painted by one
particular, historically situated individual. In both cases, to deny any relation between creator
and creation would be as foolish as to [in Chaudhuri’s case, passionately or pityingly] identify
the two. The reality is, one might say, that they are embedded in one another. (167)
What then is the nature of this analogy, and how might it relate to the vexed issue of the
nature of Chaudhuri’s novels?
Family Resemblances II: Chaudhuri and Manet
On Mulhall’s account, Fried’s Manet, like his novelistic counterparts, is engaged in the
critical questioning of the realist conventions by and through which the history of his
artistic endeavour has been determined—the most central or primordial of which, in his
case, is that paintings are made to be viewed or beheld, and therefore presuppose the
existence of a viewer or beholder capable of doing so. According to Fried however, the
contemporary condition which gives rise to such questioning, and to which Manet’s
work is a response, is one in which that convention has become deeply problematic for
the enterprise of painting as such. For he takes it (drawing on the critical writings of
Diderot) that by roughly the same period as that in which a loss of conviction in its
prevailing conventions to represent reality was being felt by writers and readers in the
genre of the novel, serious painters had started to sense that the existence or presence of a
beholder could no longer be taken for granted—that the representations of reality found
in painting were no longer capable of gripping or absorbing their increasingly estranged
and alienated viewers, a development that threatened a loss of conviction in the very idea
of pictorial representation itself, in the sheer possibility of creating convincing depictions
of reality by means of pigment on canvas (irrespective of the specific painterly conventions
artists might employ); and thereby endangered the status of painting as a major art.
Fried goes to explain that if such a threat was to be averted, the artist therefore had to
create paintings that somehow earned, accomplished, or affirmed the beholder’s presence
or existence. As such, the essential task of the painter becomes above all to attract, arrest
and finally to enthrall a beholder; to create a painting that brings the viewer to a stop in
front of itself and holds her there in a state of perfect absorptive involvement, as if
spellbound. If, however, the painting betrayed any consciousness of that task, it would
thereby court theatricality by making the beholder aware of herself, and so of the illusion
of reality by means of which she had been halted in front of the painting, thus breaking its
spell. In the face of this theatricalising force, Fried outlines two antitheatrical artistic
responses or strategies intended to recover the beholder’s absorptive attention. The first
(advocated by Diderot) embodied the seemingly paradoxical idea that only by establishing
the fiction of the beholder’s absence or nonexistence within the body of the painting
could her actual placement before it, and enthrallment by it, be secured. But crucially, for
Fried, this conception of the pictorial enterprise, and the antitheatrical strategy of which
it was a part, ultimately rested upon the supreme fiction that the beholder did not exist,
the ontological illusion that she was not really there, standing before the canvas. But since
of course, any as it were fictional representation of reality can only operate in the context
of such a literal or physical scene of representation—of a canvas and a beholder facing one
another in space and time—the beholder’s existence before the canvas could no more be
negated or denied than could the canvas’s existence before the beholder. Consequently,
this antitheatrical tradition in effect committed itself to the entirely incoherent aim of
denying the physical reality of its own works as well as that of those who behold them.
And since paintings exist not just as physical objects and as fictional scenes of representation,
but as products—the results of meaningful human activity—Fried sees another aspect or
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implication of this incoherent denial of the literal scene of representation to be its negation
or repression of this further fact about their nature: that in encountering a painting the
beholder is not only perceiving an object and (if that encounter is successful) absorbed in
a dramatic illusion, but is also confronting the work of another human being.
The second antitheatrical strategy identified by Fried, which he takes as finding its
paradigmatic expression in Manet, is diametrically opposed to the first. For he sees Manet
as attempting to reconstruct the specific painterly conventions he has been bequeathed in
such a way as to acknowledge, rather than to deny, the apparently ineliminable conditions
of pictorial representation as such. Manet’s work thus realises three essential interrelated
conditions or dimensions of any given painting: its material reality as a physical object (as
pigment on canvas); its capacity to generate fictional pictorial space (thus relating it to a
beholder); and its createdness (as a canvas that has been deliberately painted, thus relating
it to a maker or producer). And according to Fried, Manet’s acknowledgment of the
createdness of his work is to be found in his unprecedented emphasis on the reality of the
models that served him in his painting, and so of the scene of the studio in which they
were painted (the as it were primordial or ontologically prior scene of representation to
which his work’s subsequent literal and fictional representative descendants are necessarily
indebted); an emphasis that effectively prolongs the act of painting within—and so makes
it continuous with—the painting itself. By forcibly directing his viewers’ attention to this
relationship between painter, painting, and model, Fried understands Manet as thereby
attempting to produce work which acknowledges itself as the site of his own artistic
efforts—as having its origins in the actions of a particular human being—and so makes it
possible for a beholder to acknowledge her role as the beholder of intentional worked
object, of the work that goes into producing a work of art.
In the present context, however, it is this third constitutive condition of painting that is
of particular relevance. For we can now understand Mulhall’s analogy between Costello
and Manet to centre on their shared acknowledgement of the createdness of their respective
works of art—their natures as products of their respective creator’s artistic efforts. Costello’s
identification of her life as the main or only resource upon which her writing draws
thereby acknowledges that writing as essentially related to or conditioned by that life, as
having been written by a particular, culturally and historically locatable, human being.
But at the same time, since that createdness is only one of three determining dimensions
of anything recognisable as a literary (or pictorial) work of art, it cannot properly be
understood as exhaustive of it, as if the latter were simply reducible to or straightforwardly
identifiable with it. Rather if such work is to be properly acknowledged, by both novelist
and reader, it must in addition be acknowledged as both a physical object (since one
cannot acknowledge the process of creating a product without thereby acknowledging
the product of that process), and as having the capacity to create fictional representations
of reality. For Mulhall then (drawing on a phrase of Costello’s), it seems more accurate to
characterise the relation between Fire and Ice and its author—between creation and creator—
as one of “embedding”, rather than identity (or indeed difference): that although the
literary or artistic achievement of Costello’s fiction is rooted or embedded in an originating
matrix of literal—cultural, historical, and not to forget psychic and familial—contexts and
factors that undeniably significantly condition or determine it; they do not thereby exhaust
or define it. As Costello affirms, Fire and Ice isn’t an autobiography, it is a work of fiction.
Extending this analogy to Chaudhuri, we might then understand Friend of My Youth’s
unprecedented emphasis on its author, on the reality of the person who served in its
writing—an emphasis that in effect makes the work of writing continuous with the work
itself (most explicitly in the novel’s concluding reference to its own composition)—as a
similar acknowledgment of its createdness. Indeed, we might say that Chaudhuri’s persistent
and forceful direction of his readers’ attention, throughout his literary career, to the
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ineluctable relationship between novelist and novel (embedding himself within them by
drawing upon or writing from his life) thereby allows him to produce novels which both
acknowledge him—the specific human being that he is—as their creator, and themselves
as the products of that particular human being’s creative efforts (thus embedding them
within him). But again like Costello, insofar as Chaudhuri takes the createdness of his
novels as not definitive of them (that everything in them is from life and nothing is, that
the events they contain both had happened and had not) he claims that his novels are not
memoirs but fictions in which, as he puts it, “I make up stories about my life” (7.1). And
in so doing, Chaudhuri thereby identifies his novels as embodying a critical relation to
the literary conventions which he has inherited—to the genre’s prevailing understanding
of the distinctions between the realms of facts and of fiction, and of truth and untruth—
and so, to the nature of the novel itself and its relation to other literary genres (most
immediately, autobiography).
 Against this background, the patronising question about the essentially autobiographical
nature of Friend of My Youth posed by Chaudhuri’s interlocutor can be diagnosed as
symptomatic of a chronic, recognisably Diderotian, denial of the mutually determining
nature of these conditions. But whereas in the case of painting, that antitheatrical tradition
denied those conditions by emphasising the fictional scene of representation and thereby
occluded or repressed its literal counterpart, Chaudhuri’s interlocutor would appear to be
doing the reverse: focussing exclusively on the literal createdness of the novel, and so on
the person of its creator, to the extent that its capacity to generate fictional representations
is entirely negated. As Mulhall puts it, it is as if in the Diderotian mode of antitheatricality,
the fictional and the literal are essentially self-cancelling, either the former blocks a proper
attentiveness to the latter, or vice versa; thereby making it impossible to keep the two in
focus simultaneously (155).
More generally, we can see this reductive impulse to identify Chaudhuri the character
with Chaudhuri the author—to straightforwardly relate fictional creations to the biography
of their creator—as yet another of the continuing attempts by the author’s critics (and
indeed his admirers) to locate his work in relation to certain specific cultural and historical
contexts. But doing so to the extent that, self-defeatingly, their grip on the purported
object of their attention—the literary achievement that presumably initiated their original
attraction—slips away. And insofar as his readers give in to such an impulse, the familiar
sense of independent existence or autonomy which Chaudhuri (typically of writers of
fiction) takes his characters to possess is essentially denied. Rather, it seems that such
readers are not fully prepared to allow that Chaudhuri’s literary progeny can ever break
with or outgrow the life of their, so to speak, suffocating parent; thus making them
effectively stillborn (or at best disablingly dependent), not so much embedded in their
originating matrix or womb as buried.
This importance of the role of critic is something to which a lifelong friend and inter-
locutor of Fried, the philosopher Stanley Cavell, gives particular attention, in his
understanding of modernism as a condition in which the relation between the present
practice of an enterprise and its history has become inherently problematic.4 For he takes it
to be a consequence of that condition that the challenges faced by the creator of a modernist
work are ones that are mirrored or shared by its critical audience, since neither are able to
rely upon or take for granted the governing conventions they have been bequeathed by the
past of their particular practice in order to determine how, and indeed if, the work they
create or behold is a genuine example of its living present. For the modernist artist then,
nothing outside the work can establish its value or significance; and similarly for her critics,
nothing outside of their experience of encountering the work can show that it has established
(or failed to establish) the same. Instead, both must look to the work itself to validate, entirely
from its own resources, whatever claims might be made with regard to its successfully
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exemplifying the present continuation of the relevant artistic tradition, or its failing to do
so. In other words, the immediate task of the modernist work of art is to stake a self-
reliant or autonomous claim, both for its own existence and for that of the tradition
which it aims to inherit; to as it were give account of itself (call it an autobiography) that
will attempt to elicit or invite from its audience the conviction that it has earned the right
to be acknowledged as a work of art, as deserving of that title as established examples
from the history of that endeavour, and thereby allow that tradition to have a future.5
The particular burden of the modernist critic is thus to ensure that she gives genuine
consideration to the invitation or opportunity that the work embodies. She must make
certain that her impression or evaluation of the work is the result of giving her absolute
and sincere critical attention to her personal experience of encountering the work as it is
in itself; rather than the result of an impersonal and mechanical, essentially prejudicial,
application of ingrained professional conventions, labels and expectations. The former
will express her openness to the future, to the possibility of establishing new conventions
that can create a new creative community (of at least two) which will allow her tradition
to progress or continue; while the latter is an essentially inward- and backward-looking
impulse—a disabling or paralysing fixation with the deliverances of the past—that occludes
her ability seriously to consider the invitation that the artist’s work presents; a self-
destructive refusal of the possibility of entering into a genuine conversation about the
nature of that tradition that will, over time, lead it to go dead.
Against this perilous background, it might not then seem unreasonable to ask those
inclined to give a negative evaluation of a modernist work at least to reconsider the true
nature of their position—to ask themselves (indeed for them to see themselves as obliged
to ask themselves) whether the work has failed them, or they it (of course either could be
true). Consequently, those for whom Chaudhuri’s novels appear as a series of ever more
obvious memoirs should at least give due consideration to the possibility that their view is
grounded in various unquestioned assumptions and convictions that repressively dictate
that a novel (and indeed, an autobiography) must necessarily possess certain features and
take a certain form, rather than being grounded in a genuinely open encounter with it.
Ironically, we might diagnose such a view as symptomatic of the failure of the creative or
imaginative powers of such critics to appreciate the nature and possibilities of the novel as
a genre at precisely the point at which they attribute exactly the same failure (manifest in
his reliance on real people and events) to Chaudhuri as a novelist: in effect, making their
criticism a self-criticism.
Accordingly, the supercilious refusal of Chaudhuri’s interlocutor to acknowledge the
fictional character of Friend of My Youth—to see there only autobiography—is not only
indicative of a literal-minded failure on his part to exercise those powers in relation to that
work, but to the genre as a whole. And of course, insofar as the construction of any novel’s
fictional impression of reality depends on the work of its readers as much as its author, those
same imaginative powers are required by the interlocutor if he is to have any possibility of
appreciating (positively or otherwise) other examples of the genre. His smirk thus betokens
or betrays a reader at increasing risk of denying, or being stripped of, his capacity to imagine,
and so of the very possibility of being a reader of fiction at all. A pitiful condition indeed.
But, importantly, this is not to suggest that any and all modernist writing can or should
take an autobiographical form—that the only way a modernist author can properly
acknowledge the createdness of her work is by writing autobiography (this would in
effect be to repeat or succumb to the same failure of imagination as Chaudhuri’s Diderotian
interlocutor)—but it is to suggest that writing which does can be seen as responding to a
recognisably modernist concern, and so cannot be immediately dismissed as an example
of the relevant genre (as simply or self-indulgently autobiographical) for doing so. For of
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course, if an author finds herself no longer able to draw upon the impersonal conventions
that she has inherited to determine the nature and value of her work, she will then naturally
have nothing else to draw upon but personal conventions (as Costello might put it, she
must become her own main resource, in a sense her only resource); inevitably foregrounding
herself in inherently personal artistic statements aimed at establishing new conventions, and
so a new artistic community with each of her individual readers. And since the particular
genre to which Chaudhuri finds himself repeatedly drawn is one which, from its birth, has
displayed a parasitic or cannibalistic relation both to other literary genres and to itself, the
fact that he writes novels that manifest a closeness to another genre—that which takes the
expression of such personal statements as its defining business—should really be the very
reverse of surprising to his audience. Indeed, one might well wonder why they would
expect anything less from a gifted contemporary novelist genuinely deserving of that title.6
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Notes
1 “Why I Write Novels”. The text of the lecture was subsequently published online in n+1. In the
absence of page numbers and section titles, all references to the text will be given by specifying
the numbers of the relevant section and paragraph (e.g., material from the fourth paragraph of
the third section would be cited as Chaudhuri 3.4).
2 Specifically, chs. 9 and 10 of his The Wounded Animal.
3 Mulhall draws here on Fried’s magisterial trilogy Absorption and Theatricality; Courbet’s Realism;
and Manet’s Modernism.
4 Most explicitly, in his early collection of essays Must We Mean What We Say?
5 One might then say that the genuinely autobiographical character of Chaudhuri’s novels is to be
found not in the fact that he writes from life, but rather in the fact that they constitute works that
he has taken a stand on, or stands behind—ones to which he is willing to put his name. In this
sense, the autobiographical point is not that the novels contain his story, but that they are his.
6 I would like to thank Stephen Mulhall and Amit Chaudhuri for comments on a draft of this paper.
Works Cited
Cavell, Stanley. Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Chaudhuri, Amit. “Why I Write Novels.” n+1, 3 Dec 2020, nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-
only/why-i-write-novels.
Fried, Michael. Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot. University of
Chicago Press, 1980.
Fried, Michael. Courbet’s Realism. University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Fried, Michael. Manet’s Modernism, or, The Face of Painting in the 1860s. University of Chicago
Press, 1996.
Mulhall, Stephen. The Wounded Animal: J. M. Coetzee & the Difficulty of Reality in Literature and
Philosophy. Princeton University Press, 2009.
